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Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine Rainer Forst’s account of 
‘noumenal power’1. Forst’s proposal for a revised ‘critical theory of power’2 is 
firmly embedded in his philosophical understanding of ‘the right to 
justification’3. Whereas the latter has been extensively discussed in the 
secondary literature, the former has – with the exception of various exchanges 
that have taken place between Forst and his critics at academic conferences – 
received little attention. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap in the 
literature. Given the increasing influence of Forst’s scholarly writings on 
paradigmatic developments in contemporary critical theory, it is imperative to 
scrutinize the key assumptions underlying his conception of ‘noumenal power’ 
and to assess its usefulness for overcoming the shortcomings of alternative 
explanatory frameworks. In order to accomplish this, the analysis is divided into 
four parts. The first part provides some introductory definitional reflections on the 
concept of power. The second part focuses on several dichotomous meanings 
attached to the concept of power – notably, ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, ‘power 
to’ vs. ‘power over’, and ‘power for’ vs. ‘power against’. The third part elucidates 
the principal features of Forst’s interpretation of ‘noumenal power’, in addition to 
drawing attention to his typological distinction between ‘power’, ‘rule’, 
‘domination’, and ‘violence’. The final part offers an assessment of Forst’s account of 
‘noumenal power’, arguing that, although it succeeds in avoiding the 
drawbacks of rival approaches, it suffers from significant limitations. The paper 
concludes by giving a synopsis of the vital insights that can be obtained from 
the preceding inquiry. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
I. The concept of power 
‘Power’ is a highly controversial concept, which has been, and continues to be, 
given numerous different meanings in both academic and non-academic 
discourses. Notwithstanding the question of whether or not one shares Forst’s 
view that ‘the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, 
especially in the context of normative discussions’4, a cursory survey of the 
relevant literature suffices to illustrate that the term ‘power’ remains an 
‘essentially contested’5 category in social and political thought. In a general 
sense, it refers to an actor’s ability to do something in one way or another. In 
German, the noun Macht (‘power’), which is semantically related to the verb 
machen (‘to make’ or ‘to do’), expresses this basic meaning of the concept of power. 
In Latin languages, the emphasis is placed on ‘capacity’ to describe ‘power’: in 
French, pouvoir; in Italian, potere; in Spanish, poder. These terms suggest that 
access to ‘power’ requires the capacity to do something and/or to act upon 
the world in a particular way.6 
To be sure, it would be erroneous to assume that ‘a power relation is 
necessarily a relation of subordination and domination’7, since such a fatalistic 
perspective would make it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between 
legitimate and illegitimate ‘forms of the exercise of power’8. Notwithstanding the 
question of whether one wishes to make a case for the ‘essentially noumenal 
nature’9 of power or seeks to characterize the fundamental constitution of 
power in an alternative way, it is crucial not to reduce all modes of exercising 
power to their negative, repressive, or oppressive variants. For such a one-
sided approach draws attention away from those kinds of power that lead to, 
or presuppose, both genuine and legitimate processes of human 
empowerment. The objective of the next sections is to contribute to a 
sociologically insightful, comprehensive, and non-reductive understanding of 
power. 
 
II. Dichotomies of power 
It is striking that, within both classical and contemporary currents of social 
and political thought, it is common to attach numerous dichotomous 
meanings to the concept of power. This tendency appears to suggest that it 
is possible to distinguish fundamental types of power in binary terms. In this 
respect, the following conceptual oppositions are especially
  
 
important: (1) ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, (2) ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, and (3) 
‘power for’ vs. ‘power against’. 
 (1) There is the distinction between ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’. The former 
is ‘soft’ in the sense that it refers to symbolic forms of power. These may be 
articulated conceptually, linguistically, discursively, and/or ideologically. The 
latter is ‘hard’ in the sense that it concerns material forms of power. These may 
be observed and measured empirically, insofar as they constitute tangible 
components of social reality. Soft power, as a ‘constructivist’ may suggest, is 
about the representational world; it is made of symbolic forms – such as 
conceptual, linguistic, discursive, and/or ideological imaginaries. By contrast, 
‘[r]eal and hard power, a “realist” might say, is about the empirical world, it is 
made of material stuff, like political positions, monetary means or, ultimately, 
military instruments of force’10. In short, the former is aimed at persuasion, 
whereas the latter asserts its influence by virtue of coercion. 
 (2) There is the distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. The former 
designates an entity’s capacity to do something and/or to act upon the 
world in a particular way. In this sense, it may be described as a productive form 
of power. The latter captures an entity’s capacity to exercise influence, or even 
control, over something or somebody in a particular way and to a specific 
extent. In this sense, it may be interpreted as a coercive form of power. ‘Power to’ 
is essential to social order, and indeed to human life, insofar as subjects need 
to be able to act upon the world, in order to shape it according to their 
individual and collective interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or convictions. 
Actors cannot construct the symbolic and the material elements of their reality 
unless they possess a certain degree of power to do so. The purposive, 
cooperative, and creative potential of human entities would be useless without 
their capacity to exercise at least a minimal amount of ‘power to’ when relating 
to, attaching meaning to, and acting upon the world. 
'Power over’ is crucial to the stratification of behavioural, ideological, and 
institutional patterns of existence that emerge within social order in particular 
and within human life in general, illustrating that subjects have to be able to 
influence one another, in order to shape each other’s interests, needs, desires, 
beliefs, and/or convictions. Actors cannot construct the symbolic and the 
material elements of their reality unless they exercise a certain degree of power 
over one another. People’s ability to have an impact upon the objective, 
normative, and subjective dimensions of their existence is inconceivable 
without their capacity to exercise at least a minimal amount of ‘power over’ the 
physical, social, and personal facets of their lifeworlds. 
  
  
• ‘Power to’ can be defined as the capacity of A to think or to do something in 
accordance with A’s – consciously or unconsciously pursued – interests, needs, desires, 
beliefs, and/ or convictions. 
• ‘Power over’ can be defined as ‘the capacity of A to motivate B to think or do 
something that B would otherwise not have thought or done’11. 
In relation to both the former and the latter, it is important to recognize that 
something may be thought or ‘done for (and by using) good or bad reasons’12 – that 
is, the validity of the grounds on which something is conceptually or empirically 
performed is, at least in principle, contestable. With respect to both the former and 
the latter, it is, furthermore, vital  to acknowledge that both A and B may end up 
thinking or doing something ‘for  the  sake  of or contrary to’13 A’s  and/or B’s  interests. 
In brief, both the cogency of the reasons behind and the role of the interests 
underlying human thoughts and actions are not necessarily 
straightforward, let alone transparent. 
 (3) There is the distinction between ‘power for’ and ‘power against’. The 
former stands for power as the assertion of something or somebody. The latter 
refers to power as the rejection of something or somebody. The dialectics of 
‘power for’ and ‘power against’ – which may be conceived of in terms of the 
relationship between ‘power’ and ‘counter-power’14 or, if one prefers, ‘power’ 
and ‘anti-power’15 – lies at the heart of behavioural, ideological, and 
institutional struggles between asymmetrically positioned actors in stratified 
societies. Indeed, the conflict between experiences of empowerment and 
experiences of disempowerment is embedded in the friction between 
mechanisms of domination and processes of emancipation, which appears to 
permeate all stratified small-scale and large-scale societal formations.16 
It would be mistaken, however, to establish a normative hierarchy between 
‘power for’ and ‘power against’. Just as both of them can involve experiences 
of empowerment and processes of emancipation, both of them can entail 
experiences of disempowerment and mechanisms of domination. Still, the 
dialectics of ‘power for’ and ‘power against’ indicates that the deep ambivalence 
of the human condition is an object of permanent struggle for and against 
specific constellations of power. One of the most obvious, and historically most 
tangible, examples of this ambivalence is the tension-laden constitution of 
modernity.17 On the one hand, there is a dark modernity: its repressive facets 
cannot be dissociated from the socio-historical preponderance of instrumental 
reason. On the other hand, there is a bright modernity: its emancipatory aspects 
have been brought about, as well as grasped, by the discursive force of critical 
reason.18 The former ‘are intimately associated with variations of control – such 
as power, authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure, and heteronomy – 
  
 
and materialize themselves in social processes of domination, regulation, 
exploitation, alienation, fragmentation, exclusion, and discrimination’19. The 
latter ‘are expressed in Enlightenment ideals – such as progress, tolerance, 
liberty, equality, solidarity, dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy – and manifest 
themselves in social processes of liberation, self-determination, and 
unification’20. Irrespective of the kind of objectives that individual and collective 
actors may, or may not, pursue in particular contexts, their daily efforts to 
gain access to material and symbolic resources are entangled in struggles ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ constellations of power. 
 
III. Noumenal power 
This section proposes to elucidate the principal features of Forst’s account of 
noumenal power. In the relevant literature, one is confronted with a large variety of 
approaches to power: Hobbesian, Lockean, Rousseauian, Marxian, Durkheimian, 
Weberian, Arendtian, Schmittean, Foucauldian, Bourdieusian, Habermasian, 
Honnethian, Fraserian, and Butlerian approaches – to mention only a few. The 
term ‘power’ is a contestable concept, to which different meanings can be 
ascribed, depending on the theoretical perspective one may wish to defend. We 
should concede at the outset that no definition of power ‘is available that 
avoids essential contestation’21, even if Forst harbours the hope that his own 
explanatory framework may be an exception in this respect.22 As we shall see, it is 
worth considering Forst’s proposal for a critical theory of noumenal power in 
detail. In essence, his conceptual outline is based on several key assumptions, 
which shall be examined in subsequent sections. 
 
1. Cognitivism 
Power cannot be understood without taking into account the cognitive structures 
and processes by which it is sustained. In order to shed light on the underlying 
factors shaping the power of power exercised by human actors, it is 
imperative to grasp ‘what goes on in the heads of those who are subjected to its 
power or who have freed themselves from it’23. Noumenal power is firmly 
embedded in spheres of cognition – that is, in realms of reflection and intention. 
This is not to suggest, however, that noumenal power constitutes ‘a separate 
form of power alongside threats of force’24. Rather, this is to affirm that ‘it is the 
very core of such threats as exercises of power’25. Put differently, all human 
forms of power can be characterized as ‘noumenal’ to the extent that they 
cannot be dissociated from the mental configurations and activities that 
  
  
produce, reproduce, and – potentially – transform them. In order to 
comprehend ‘how an exercise of power moves persons’26, we need to provide 
‘a cognitive account of power that is neutral with regard to its positive or negative 
evaluation’27. Such a noumenal approach conceives of power as ‘the capacity of A 
to motivate B to think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done’28. 
According to this definition, the cognitive (‘to think’) and the performative (‘to 
do’) dimensions of social existence are fundamental to the exercise of power. In a 
world constructed by subjects capable of self-justification, there is no exercise of 
power through particular actions without the motivational influence exerted by 
structures and processes of cognition. 
 
2. Rationalism 
Power, as it unfolds within and exerts its influence upon the social world, cannot 
be divorced from the civilizational force of reason. Indeed, ‘to have and to exercise 
power means to be able – in different degrees – to influence, use, determine, occupy, or 
even seal off the space of reasons for others’29. Even if – and, on some occasions, 
especially when – it may not be immediately obvious that, and how, the 
exercise of power is inextricably linked to shaping, instrumentalizing, governing, 
colonizing, or even isolating the space of reasons, the former is unthinkable 
without the omnipresence of the latter. There is no human performativity 
without its permeation by human rationality, and vice versa. The 
intertwinement of power and reason is especially apparent in the unfolding of 
human practices that are – consciously or unconsciously – driven by ideological 
patterns of motivation. For instance, ‘[r]eligion […] is a very powerful motivating 
force in many societies and for many people’30; although radical secularists may 
argue that religious beliefs are largely or completely irrational, those who are 
motivated by faith invoke reasons when justifying their actions and/or those of 
their fellow devotees. Just as human performativity and human rationality are 
intimately interrelated, so are human practices and human interests: ‘reasons 
explain beliefs, and beliefs explain interests and actions’31. 
From a noumenal perspective, then, there is no doubt that ‘the deeper one 
digs, the more one needs to inquire into people’s reasons’32. The realm of 
reasoning – expressed in the species-constitutive capacity of justifying one’s 
actions – constitutes a foundational sphere of the anthropological condition. For 
human beings, it represents ‘the basic level of explanation of 
  
 
 
their actions as their actions – as what they see as justified’33. The historic 
transition from Mund (mouth) to Mündigkeit (maturity)34 took place, and 
continues to take place, to the degree that human subjects acquired, and 
continue to acquire, the capacity – literally – to speak on their own behalf, as 
rational – and, therefore, responsible and accountable – entities able to provide 
reasons for, and to attach justifiable motives to, their actions. ‘Justifications are 
basic, not interests or desires’35, because human practices – including the 
exercise of power – are embedded in the daily exercise of reason-guided action. 
 
3. Recognitivism 
There is no exercise of power without dynamics of recognition. Put differently, 
power relations are recognitive relations. ‘In contrast to the exercise of physical 
force or violence, power rests on recognition.’36 For its existence needs to be 
implicitly or explicitly confirmed by both those who exercise it and those over 
whom it is exercised, in order to exert any kind of influence at all. Even – or, 
perhaps, especially – in situations in which the exercise of power is reduced to 
mere physical force or violence, the attempt to reduce human subjects to sheer 
objects, deprived of their sense of autonomy and agency, cannot isolate them 
from the ‘noumenal-social contexts’37 in which they are immersed. Indeed, 
within the human world, ‘an exercise of physical force is meant to have a 
noumenal effect’38 on those exposed to it. As such, it may be aimed at robbing 
actors of their dignity. Even if and when it is intended  to accomplish this, 
however,  it implicitly recognizes  their very  humanity. 
 
4. Justificationism 
Given its meaning-laden constitution, there is always an implicit or explicit reason 
behind the exercise of noumenal power. ‘The exercise and effects of power are 
based on the recognition of a reason – or better, and more often, of various 
reasons – to act differently than one would have acted without that reason.’39 
Subjects, when exercising a particular form of power, need to be motivated by ‘a 
“good enough” reason to act’40 and do so by virtue of implicit or explicit 
justifications. In fact, ‘[p]ower rests on recognized, accepted justifications’41. 
Irrespective of the question of whether – from an external point of view – their 
justifications may be regarded as ‘good’ or ‘bad, ‘convincing’ or ‘unconvincing, 
‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’, they are vital to the exercise, as well as to the efficiency, 
of power. From a noumenal perspective, ‘power exists only when there is such 
  
 
acceptance’42 of presuppositions, whose validity needs to be projected onto 
interactional situations, in order for them to acquire legitimacy and to provide 
culturally codified spheres suitable for the unfolding of human agency. 
 
5. Pluralism 
When navigating their way through the matrix of social life, actors are 
confronted with ‘a spectrum of kinds of acceptance’43. These range from those 
founded on critical reflection and personal conviction, those motivated by 
sheer opportunism and complicity, to those based on arbitrary authority and 
forceful imposition. Notwithstanding the normative defensibility of implicit or 
explicit patterns of justification, the noumenal constitution of the social world 
implies that all human forms of power, in order to acquire a noticeable degree 
of empirical significance, require being validated through variegated processes 
of recognition. 
The heterogeneous constitution of social life manifests itself in the pluralist 
configuration of justifications. Different interactional realms generate, and are in 
turn generated by, different ‘spaces of justifications’44. The objective, normative, 
and subjective presuppositions underlying specific patterns of justification 
diverge across spatiotemporally contingent contexts. A comprehensive ‘analysis 
(and critique) of power must reconstruct these different modes and their possible 
combinations in a given social situation’45, in order to account for the fact that 
subjects capable of action and self-justification can be motivated by ‘various 
reasons’46 when exercising, or responding to, particular modes of noumenal 
power. In short, noumenal types of power are no less pluralized than the life 
forms within which, and in relation to which, they operate. 
 
6. Motivationism 
Power – as it is exercised within, and exerts its impact upon, the human world – 
needs to be understood in motivational terms. Regardless of their specific – for 
instance, intuitive or discursive, practical or theoretical, instrumental or value-
rational, pragmatic or ideological, internal or external – grounds of motivation, 
actors have to be driven in one way or another in order to exercise power. 
Crucially, however, power may not only be shaped by the motivations of the actor 
exercising it, but also be aimed at influencing the motivations of other individual or 
collective actors. The difference between these two options is expressed in the 
aforementioned distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’: the former 
designates the capacity of A to think or to do something in accordance with A’s 
  
 
– consciously or unconsciously pursued – interests, needs, desires, beliefs, 
and/or convictions; the latter refers to ‘the capacity of A to motivate B to think or 
do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done’47. 
 
7. Performativism 
Power is inconceivable without the performative structures and processes by 
which it is supported. In order to shed light on the underlying factors shaping 
the power of power exercised by human actors, it is essential to comprehend 
what actors do by virtue of power, as well as what they fail to do due to their 
(relative or absolute) lack of access to power.48 Noumenal power is located in 
spheres of action – that is, in realms of practices, performances, and 
enactments. Thus, ‘power to’49 concerns the capacity to do something, whereas 
‘power over’50 relates to the capacity to do something to somebody else by 
exercising a certain degree of control over their thought and/or behaviour. 
Owing to the noumenal constitution of power, the German word Macht is 
usually employed to describe a power relation exercised over human 
subjects, rather than over nonhuman forms of existence. The fact that Macht 
is exerted exclusively over human, rather than nonhuman, entities is indicative 
of the noumenal constitution of power in the social world: the human 
exercise of ‘power over’ (Macht) is conceivable only as a distinctly human 
performance (machen) in relation to human performers (Macher). 
 
8. Consequentialism 
The exercise of power would be pointless if the consequences triggered by it 
were irrelevant. As stated above, ‘to have and to exercise power means to be able – in 
different degrees – to influence, use, determine, occupy, or even seal off the space of reasons 
for others’51. Unless it succeeds in being ‘socially effective’52, the exercise of power is 
futile. If subjects exerting both particular types and particular degrees of 
power were not concerned with the consequences of their actions, their 
performances would remain largely irrelevant – not only to themselves, but 
also to their natural and social environments. Hence, to recognize that ‘the 
phenomenon of power is noumenal in nature’53 is to acknowledge that 
the social world is a conglomerate of both ‘things in themselves’ (Dinge an 
sich) and ‘things for themselves’ (Dinge für sich) – that is, of forms of being that 
are objectively present, normatively assembled, and subjectively grasped. 
Power constitutes a consequentialist category in the sense that it impacts 
upon the physical, social, and personal dimensions of our existence as well 
  
 
as, more importantly, upon the ways in which we engage, or fail to engage, 
with them.54 There would be no point in exercising power if it bore no 
relation to the objective, normative, and subjective construction of reality. 
 
9. Normativism 
Noumenal power constitutes a normative force. As such, it is always open to 
questioning, competition, and struggle. Therefore, ‘any analysis of noumenal 
power has to accept ambivalence and contestation; it can never be final and 
completely objective’55. Revealing its normative constitution, noumenal power 
is enmeshed in social relations whose participants – since they are equipped 
with critical, reflexive, and moral capacities – possess a sense of justice.56 Put 
differently, noumenal power is exercised by, as well as exerted upon, actors 
who constantly produce, reproduce, and transform normative orders.57 
Behavioural, ideological, and institutional patterns of functioning are 
inconceivable without their validation by means of noumenal power within 
realms of normativity, which provide the presuppositional parameters for 
generating sustainable degrees of social legitimacy. In fact, ‘the first demand of 
justice of those subjected to a normative order’58 is ‘to have standing as equal 
normative authorities within such an order’59. Both the exercise of and the 
exposure to noumenal power are symptomatic of human subjects’ need to 
define – and, if required, to redefine – the place they occupy within normative 
orders. They are able to act upon this need, however, only to the degree that 
their ‘right to justification’60 is implicitly or explicitly recognized. Ideally, ‘all those 
who are subjected to a normative order should be its co-authors as equal 
participants and normative authorities in adequate justificatory practices that 
critically reflect on and constitute that order’61. 
Every normative order is constructed, and potentially reconstructed, by 
actors with ‘normative powers’62. These powers emanate from people’s critical, 
reflexive, and moral capacities, by means of which they can attach meaning 
to, make judgements about, and position themselves in relation to social 
arrangements by either confirming or undermining their legitimacy. ‘Every social 
order in general, and every social subsystem in particular, is based on a 
certain understanding of its purpose, aims, and rules – in short, it is a nor- 
mative order as an order of justification.’63 Notwithstanding the typological 
specificity of the social realm one may wish to examine, each of them 
possesses not only its own mode of functioning but also its own order of 
justification. Consider, for instance, the following social realms: the economic 
  
 
realm, the political realm, the cultural realm, the artistic realm, the religious 
realm, the scientific realm, the technological realm, or the military realm – to 
mention only a few. In each of these social realms, subjects justify their actions 
in different ways, but they do so by referring (implicitly or explicitly) to the 
underlying grammar of the normative order in which they find themselves 
immersed. It is possible to characterize a normative order as ‘democratically 
ruled’64 to the extent that those who build it are ‘the normative authorities 
who co-determine this order through democratic justification procedures’65 – 
that is, ‘through the rule of reciprocally and generally justifiable reasons’66 
invoked by those able and willing to articulate – and, if necessary, to defend – 
them. Given every human actor’s ineluctable situatedness within normative 
orders, there are no forms of noumenal power capable of bypassing the 
foundational status of justificatory processes. 
 
10. Contextualism 
Noumenal power cannot be exercised ‘in isolation from noumenal-social 
contexts’67. As such, it is not a free-floating force, abstracted from 
spatiotemporally contingent settings. Rather, it is always situated in space and 
time – that is, in relationally configured sets of circumstances encountered, as 
well as shaped, by human actors. Noumenal power may emerge in a variety 
of contexts: ‘in the context of a single event’68, such as a performative act carried 
out by a charismatic figure; in ‘in the context […] of a sequence of events’69, such as a 
succession of small-scale or large-scale happenings changing the course of 
history; or, in the context of ‘a general social situation or structure’70, forming the 
intersectionally constituted background to interactions taking place between 
different subjects. In a broad sense, every type of noumenal power is 
embedded in an objective context of physical states of affairs, in a normative 
context of cultural conventions and arrangements, as well as in a subjective 
context of personal feelings, thoughts, and perceptions.71 In short, there is no 
noumenal power without a particular context, or sets of contexts, in which it is 
located and to which both those exercising it and those exposed to it make 
implicit or explicit reference when engaging in social interaction. 
 
11. Coherentism 
Noumenal power, in order for it to be effective, requires a minimal degree of 
coherence. In essence, this is due to its embeddedness in different forms of order – 
notably, social orders72, normative orders73, orders of justification74, orders of action75, 
  
 
political orders76, and – finally yet importantly – orders of power77. Inevitably, both the 
exercise of and the exposure to noumenal power take place within different 
kinds of order. In fact, its attachment to socio-ontologically contingent 
variants of order reveals its multifaceted constitution: noumenal power is 
simultaneously a social, normative, justificatory, performative, political, and potent 
manifestation of symbolically mediated modes of existence. Its situatedness 
within a range of orders is indicative of the grammatical organization of 
power. 
 
12. Discursivism 
Noumenal power is articulated through different discourses. As such, it is 
exercised through the construction of different narratives – notably, narratives of 
justification.78 It is not simply because human beings are storytelling animals 
but, rather, because they need to provide rationally defensible justifications 
for their actions that the narratives they attach to their experiences are crucial 
to their exercise of, as well as exposure to, noumenal power. ‘In the light of 
such narratives, social relations and institutions and certain ways of thinking 
and acting appear as justified and legitimate […].’79 In this respect, the primary 
question is not whether these narratives stand up to scrutiny, when dissecting 
their epistemic claims to universal validity, but, rather, whether they permit those 
who implicitly or explicitly endorse them to justify their thoughts and actions in 
relation to the particular sets of circumstances in which they find themselves 
situated. Put differently, narratives of justification constitute discursive 
frameworks that attribute coherence, cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural, 
ideological, and institutional expressions of both individual and collective 
modes of agency. 
 
13. Foundationalism 
Noumenal power, regardless of its capacity to impose itself upon the course of 
history, cannot be exercised, let alone experienced, by human subjects without 
presuming that they possess a right to justification.80 Of course, while this right 
can be implicitly or explicitly recognized, it can also be covertly or openly 
misrecognized, undermined, or violated. Yet, all efforts to deny its existence –  
irrespective of whether they are based on argument or on force – are futile in 
that, ultimately, they highlight its ubiquity in all realms of human sociality: the very 
attempt to repudiate the right to justification presupposes the right to justification; 
for such an endeavour can claim to possess objective, normative, or subjective 
  
 
validity only to the extent that it can purport to be justified. Far from being 
reducible to a metaphysical fantasy, the ‘right to justification of social and political 
relations between free and equal persons’81 is embedded in communicatively 
structured lifeworlds, in which all subjects are not only capable of speech and 
action but also capable of reflection, interpretation, and explanation. 
Notwithstanding the situational or typological specificities of the numerous ways 
in which noumenal power may, or may not, operate, it cannot bypass, let alone 
eliminate, the right to justification enjoyed by those who exercise, and those who 
are exposed  to, it. 
 
14. Structuralism 
‘An important test of the realism of the theory of noumenal power is whether it 
can explain the power of “structures”, be it general social structures or more 
particular organizational structures […].’82 When seeking to shed light on the 
structural constitution of social life, it is vital to recognize the centrality of four 
aspects of noumenal power: 
(a) Grounding: There is no social order, and indeed no social subsystem, that is 
not founded on a specific ‘understanding of its purpose, aims, and rules’83. 
Every interactional order established between directly or indirectly 
interrelated subjects constitutes a ‘normative order’84 based on an ‘order 
of justification’85. The more differentiated a society becomes, the more 
diverse the justification narratives on which its order as well as its 
subsystems are based turn out to be. Far from being sustained by ‘a 
single grand narrative alone’86, all social orders and social subsystems are 
produced, reproduced, and transformed by multiple – coexisting and, on 
several levels, competing – patterns of justification. 
(b) Reproduction: Social structures, in order to be both relatively stable and 
relatively forceful, need to be ‘accepted on the basis of […] narratives 
and justifications’87 by those who draw upon and function within them. 
Irrespective of their actual or potential limitations and shortcomings, as 
long as they are perceived as ‘inevitable’, or even as ‘natural’, they tend 
to imprint themselves in the minds and bodies of those who 
consciously or unconsciously reinforce their legitimacy by 
reproducing them. ‘The normative power of the factual’88 is 
tantamount to the factual power of the normative, to the extent 
that ‘[w]hat goes without saying goes’89. 
  
 
(c) Influence: Social structures exert influence over human actors. As long as 
‘the noumenal power structure that supports social power relations is 
still in place’90, the latter’s background solidity is confirmed by the 
former’s interpretive narrativity, thereby maintaining a particular ‘order 
of action’91 on the basis of a viable degree of implicit or explicit justification. 
In this regard, a distinction can be drawn between ‘influence’ and ‘power’: 
the former is ‘not intentionally exercised by persons over others’92, 
whereas the latter is meaning- and purpose-laden. Structural influence 
is nonhuman and nonintentional. Noumenal power, by contrast, is human 
and intentional. ‘Structures do not “exercise” power as persons do’93, 
whereas persons ‘exercise’ power in a way that structures fail to do. 
(d) Resource: There is no noumenal power without ‘noumenal capital’94. 
Within the human world, ‘power is exercised within structures’95. Put 
differently, there is no human agency without a background of 
resourceful structurality. To the extent that ‘the essential power of such 
structures is of a noumenal kind, defining values, norms and rules and 
social positions, such power structures enable persons with sufficient 
noumenal capital in the appropriate sphere’96 to mobilize their material and 
symbolic resources to interact with and to act upon the world in a 
purposive fashion. Within spheres of noumenal power, subjects 
participate in the construction of reality by positioning themselves in 
relation to, while being positioned by, others. Thus, social structures can 
be conceived of ‘as a resource to exercise power over others’97 as well as, 
ultimately, over oneself. Indeed, without the ‘background resources’98 
provided by social structures, there is no foreground agency driven by 
noumenal power. 
 
 
15. Relationalism 
Noumenal power is, by definition, a relational state of affairs. The relational 
constitution of noumenal power has several implications. 
(a) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of sociality. As such, it describes 
‘a social relation’99 between directly or indirectly interconnected entities. 
(b) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of agency. As such, it is based on 
‘a relation between agents’100, whose performances contribute either to 
its reproduction or to its transformation. 
  
 
(c) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of indeterminacy. As such, it 
demonstrates that, ‘as long as a relation of power exists, at least one 
alternative way of acting is open’101 to those involved in its construction. 
(d) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of structurality. As such, it 
permeates both symmetrically and asymmetrically organized social 
arrangements – that is, not only relations of empowerment and 
emancipation but also ‘relation[s] of subordination and domination’102. 
(e) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of normativity. As such, it 
illustrates the sociological significance of a tension-laden constellation: 
even when ‘a relation of noumenal power turns into a relation of 
overwhelming physical facticity’103 and, consequently, the latter’s 
violence is aimed at annihilating the former’s normativity, ‘the 
exchange of justifications’104 remains the only way in which reason-giving 
entities can convert critical reflexivity into the motivational 
cornerstone of the symbolically mediated interactions shaping the 
development of society. 
(f) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of rationality. As such, it exerts its 
influence upon the world through ‘the space of reasons within which 
social or political relations are being framed – relations which form a 
structured, durable, and stable social order of action and justification’105 
and relations without which there would be no possibility of 
hermeneutically guided self-realization. 
(g) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of validity. As such, its longevity 
depends on its ability to obtain sustainable levels of discursive 
acceptability. Indeed, ‘[i]n cases of unjustifiable asymmetrical social 
relations which rest on a closing off of the space of justifications such that 
these relations appear as legitimate, natural, God-given, or in any way 
unalterable and leave hardly any alternative for those who are subjected, 
we encounter forms of domination’106. Noumenal power – even when it is 
misrepresented by the veil of total legality, infallibility, transcendentality, or 
inalterability – can never obliterate the need for discursive acceptability 
pervading all spaces of justifications, whose legitimacy hinges upon 
rationally defensible validity. 
(h) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of justification. As such, its existence 
is indicative of the fact that ‘[r]elations and orders of power are relations 
and orders of justification’107. Behavioural, ideological, and institutional 
  
 
patterns of functioning are supported by ‘narratives of justification’108, 
for the former’s quest for legitimacy would be unsustainable without the 
latter’s claims to validity. ‘All […] forms of being moved by justifications are 
“noumenal” in the relevant sense insofar as they involve a certain relation 
in the space of justifications.’109 Both ‘the justificatory quality of reasons’110 
and the rational quality of justifications are preconditions for the nou- 
menal quality of social relations. 
(i) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of reality. As such, it lies at the 
core of the empirical constitution of human existence. ‘A noumenal 
account of power relations is more “realistic” than theories which locate 
power in material or physical means’111, to the extent that the former 
uncovers the parasitical nature of the latter: in the human world, the 
exercise of merely material or physical force is derived from intentions and 
motivations, which, in order to reach at least a minimal degree of 
legitimacy, require rationally defensible justifications. Even extreme forms 
of violence cannot eliminate the forceless force of justification based on 
the better argument. 
(j) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of resources. As such, it is 
inconceivable without access to ‘noumenal capital’112. Subjects 
occupying different positions in society need to be equipped with 
different dispositions, permitting them to mobilize their material and 
symbolic resources in order to engage in processes of interaction, 
deliberation, and justification. 
(k) Noumenal power constitutes a relation of humanity. As such, it defies 
systemic tendencies towards transforming ‘social relations into relations 
between things’113. Commodification processes, following the profit-
maximizing logic of the market, as well as bureaucratization processes, 
following the administrative logic of the state, can convert subjects into 
objects and, consequently, social relations into reified relations. The 
most profound colonization of communicatively structured lifeworlds by 
instrumentally driven systems, however, cannot do away with the nominal 
power exercised by subjects capable of both action and self-justification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
A typology of power 
In order to avoid advocating a reductive conception of the noumenal 
constitution of social life, we may distinguish four types of power: 
(a) Power: The concept of ‘power’ can be defined as ‘the capacity of A to 
influence the space of reasons for B and/or C (etc.) such that they think and 
act in ways they would not have done without the interference by A’114. 
Crucial, in this respect, is the presupposition that ‘the move by A must 
have a motivating force for B and/or C (etc.) that corresponds to A’s 
intentions and is not just a side effect (i.e., a form of influence)’115. In other 
words, power is not reducible to a force that makes individual or collective 
actors behave and/or think in one way or another. Rather, it stands for a 
subject’s capacity to ensure that its purpose – based on specific goals or 
targets – is the impetus behind the processes of action and/or cognition 
performed by another individual or collective subject. 
(b) Rule: The concept of ‘rule’ refers to ‘a form of power where the power-
holder does not only use his or her capacity to decisively influence the 
space of justifications for others, but where certain comprehensive (religious, 
metaphysical, historical, or moral) justifications (and usually a mixture 
thereof) determine the space of reasons within which social or political relations are 
being framed – relations which form a structured, durable, and stable social 
order of action and justification’116. Irrespective of the question of 
whether a particular form of rule is based on good or bad justifications, it 
provides the normative framework in which human actions and 
interactions take place. Rule, then, constitutes the regulatory umbrella of 
social life. The behavioural, ideological, and institutional modes of 
functioning prevalent in different spheres of society are governed by 
different types of rule: political rule, cultural rule, educational rule, 
economic rule, judicial rule, religious rule, or scientific rule – to mention 
only  a few. There is no society without context-specific sets of rules. 
(c) Domination: The concept of ‘domination’ designates an asymmetrically 
structured power relation that hinges upon ‘a closing off of the space of 
justifications such that these relations appear as legitimate, natural, God-
given, or in any way unalterable and leave hardly any alternative for 
those who are subjected’117. Different modes of domination are sustained 
by different forms of hegemonic justification, designed to reinforce the 
notion that there is no viable alternative to the existing state of affairs. 
  
 
There are numerous means by which the ‘realm of reasons’118 can be 
sealed off, if only temporarily, three of which are particularly common: in 
the first scenario, domination may be accepted because of the 
persuasive influence of the dominant ideology; in the second scenario, 
domination may be accepted because active and explicit opposition to 
it may trigger tangible variants of repression; in the third scenario, we 
may be confronted with a combination of the previous two options. All 
forms of political domination, however, imply (i) ‘the rule by unjustifiable 
norms’119 as well as (ii) the lack of democratic procedures and structures, 
by virtue of which the normative parameters underlying a specific 
ensemble of social arrangements can be discussed, called into 
question, revised, and – if necessary – replaced by an alternative. 
(d) Violence: The concept of ‘violence’ describes a power relation in which ‘the 
exchange of justifications is denied entirely and the space of reasons is 
supplanted by means of sheer physical force’120. Any situation to which this 
applies presupposes that ‘a relation of noumenal power’121, characterized 
by the constant negotiation of normativity, is converted into ‘a relation 
of overwhelming physical facticity’122, marked by the imposition of 
illegitimate legitimacy. Under such extreme circumstances, subjects are 
degraded to mere objects, implying that, rather than being recognized 
as fully-fledged members of humanity, they are deprived of their sense 
of, and access to, self-realized and self-realizing agency. ‘At that 
moment, power as a normative force moving an even minimally free 
agent fades away […].’123 In such a constellation of reifying 
desubjectivization, the noumenal power of reason is shattered by the 
arbitrary force of violence. ‘Power is a way of binding others through 
reasons; it breaks down when the other is treated as a mere “thing” and 
no longer as an agent of justification whose compliance rests on some 
form of recognition.’124 As long as there is power in the noumenal sense, 
there are subjects able and willing to recognize one another as 
sovereign, yet interdependent, entities. 
As illustrated above, power – far from being reducible to a fixed, neat, and 
clearly defined category – should be examined in terms of a continuum of social 
relations. In the social world, power is a relation between two or more subjects, 
which manifests itself in different forms and different contexts, while shaping 
human actions and interactions to different degrees and according to 
  
 
different parameters, in addition to being governed by different causes and 
leading to different consequences. The continuum of social relations 
comprises a spectrum of power relations, which can be schematized on four 
principal levels: 
(a) the exercise of power as ‘power’, based on a subject’s capacity to 
influence other subjects by influencing the space of reasons; 
(b) the exercise of power as ‘rule’, based on a subject’s capacity to set the 
agenda within particular spaces of reasons by ensuring some 
comprehensive justificatory frameworks prevail over others; 
(c) the exercise of power as ‘domination’, based on a subject’s capacity to close 
off the space of justifications by virtue of a dominant ideology and/or a 
disciplinary system, guaranteeing the hegemonic position of the ruling 
forces; 
(d) the exercise of power (or, to be exact, power beyond power) as ‘violence’, based 
on a subject’s capacity to use mere physical force in order to pursue, 
and to realize, a specific goal. 
Ironically, the last option – that is, the use of violence – ‘lies outside of the 
realm of power, being instead a reflection of the lack of power’125, precisely 
because it suppresses the exchange of justifications between reason-giving 
subjects. The aforementioned categories are ‘ideal types’126, in the sense that, 
in practice, ‘the exercise of power usually falls somewhere in between’127 and 
may, in terms of both its causes and its consequences, fit more than one 
variant. 
  
 
 
IV. The concept of ‘noumenal power’:  limitations 
Having examined its key underlying presuppositions, it is possible to provide 
a critical assessment of Forst’s account of ‘noumenal power’. Despite its 
considerable conceptual depth and explanatory strength, Forst’s approach 
suffers from significant limitations, which shall be examined in subsequent 
sections. For the sake of clarity, we shall follow the thematic structure of the 
preceding analysis. 
 
a. The concept of power 
To begin with, Forst claims that, although the term ‘power’ is widely used in social 
and political philosophy, ‘the meaning of this important concept is rarely made 
explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions’128. Admittedly, the 
denotative sense of the word ‘power’ is often taken for granted by researchers in 
the humanities and social sciences. Furthermore, it is true that especially those 
who grapple with, shed light on, and criticize both the causes and the 
consequences of different types of asymmetrically structured social relations 
should be able to offer basic definitional, explanatory, and evaluative insights 
into the concept of ‘power’. Given the vast amount of scholarly literature 
available on the subject129, however, it is untenable to affirm that the meaning 
of this concept is hardly ever made explicit. 
At the same time, it is both naïve and deceptive to make a case for ‘a 
normatively neutral notion of power’130 and to contend that ‘we need a cognitive 
account of power that is neutral with regard to its positive or negative 
evaluation’131. There is no such thing. It is no less erroneous and short-sighted to 
maintain that, while the epistemic validity of numerous conceptions of power 
suffers from being ‘normative and contestable’132, ‘a better definition is available 
that avoids essential contestation’133. Again, there is no such thing. It is, at best, 
ironic or, at worst, baffling that an analysis that sets itself the task of aiming ‘to 
prepare the way for a critical theory of power’134 seeks to do so by giving the 
misleading impression that such an intrinsically normative endeavour can be 
accomplished by providing a ‘neutral’, ‘non-evaluative’, and ‘non-contestable’ 
approach. 
Horkheimer’s famous distinction between ‘traditional theory’ and ‘critical 
theory’135 is based on the conviction that the latter, unlike the former, recognizes 
the intrinsic normativity of all aspects of social reality, including all conceptual 
attempts to grasp its inner workings, as expressed in explanatory frameworks 
  
 
grappling with the nature of power within human societies. More specifically, 
such a reflection obliges us to draw attention to five fundamental 
presuppositions underlying the pursuit of a critical epistemology: 
First, given that knowledge is always socially embedded, it is necessarily 
normative (Erkenntnisnormativität). Second, since knowledge is always  
generated  from  a  specific position in the social space, even so-called 
descriptive knowledge is situation-laden (Erkenntnisstandpunkt). Third, to the 
extent that bodily actors, regardless of whether they are laypersons or experts, 
take on particular roles in society, knowledge is permeated by the relationally 
constituted functions fulfilled by those who make use of it in accordance with 
their contextually defined interests (Erkenntnisfunktion). Fourth, considering that 
cognitive actors are discursively competing entities, the production of knowledge 
is permeated by scientific power struggles (Erkenntniskampf). Fifth, because 
symbolic and informational resources can be used in various ways and for 
multiple reasons, the production of knowledge can be instrumentalized for 
extra-scientific – notably, economic – purposes (Erkenntnisnutzung). In short, the 
positivist quest for objectivity loses credibility when confronted with the 
relational constitution of epistemic enquiry. The conditions of knowledgeability 
are impregnated with normativity, positionality, functionality, conflictuality, and 
instrumentality.136 
A genuinely critical theory of power needs to face up to its own immersion in 
normativity, instead of pursuing the illusory goal of reaching an epistemic state 
of ‘neutrality’, capable of permitting its advocates to rise above the structural 
constraints, and perspectival intricacies, of socially constructed realities. 
 
b. Dichotomies of power 
Undoubtedly, it makes sense to distinguish fundamental types of power in 
binary terms – notably, on the basis of the aforementioned conceptual 
oppositions: (1) ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, (2) ‘power to’ vs. ‘power over’, and 
(3) ‘power for’ vs. ‘power against’. We need to acknowledge, however, that 
these dichotomous distinctions have been on the agenda ever since ‘power’ 
has been studied (both empirically and theoretically) – above all, in the 
humanities and social sciences. Arguably, Forst’s plea for a critical theory of 
power – emphasizing its allegedly ‘noumenal’ nature – fails to add useful, let 
alone original, insights to recent and ongoing debates on the significance of 
these conceptual pairs for exploring the variegated functions of different 
modes of power in the daily construction of social life. 
 
  
 
Striking in this context is Forst’s distinction between Herrschaft and Beherrschung, 
which, although it is relegated to a footnote137, illustrates the limited use value of 
semantic hair-splitting. Surely, the concept of Herrschaft (domination) remains 
central to understanding social power dynamics, which – in all human life forms – 
are shaped by the interplay between (1) ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’, (2) ‘power 
to’ and ‘power over’, as well as (3) ‘power for’ and ‘power against’. Forst claims 
that ‘[i]t is unfortunate that Herrschaft – which means rule – is usually translated as 
“domination”, which corresponds to the German Beherrschung’138. In this respect, 
however, we need to examine the validity of the assertion that Herrschaft means 
‘rule’ and that Beherrschung means ‘domination’. The noun Beherrschung is a 
concept that is hardly ever used in written, let alone spoken, German. By 
contrast, the verb beherrschen – which Forst does not mention in his account 
and which means ‘to dominate’, ‘to rule’, ‘to master’, or ‘to control’ – is 
commonly employed, not only in academic texts, but also in ordinary 
language. More importantly, even if Forst’s distinction between Herrschaft and 
Beherrschung stood up to scrutiny, it would be far from obvious what, if 
anything, could be gained (theoretically or practically) from differentiating 
between these two terms. No prominent social or political theorist seriously 
believes that ‘the exercise of power is invariably a matter of domination’139, let 
alone that we should discard the possibility that – as indicated by Max 
Weber140 – ‘legitimate rule is also an exercise of power’141. On the contrary, not only 
is the terminological distinction between ‘power’ and ‘domination’ (or, in 
German, between Macht and Herrschaft) common in contemporary social and 
political analysis, but, in addition, it continues to be an object of controversy. 
Indeed, this conceptual separation compels us to reflect upon the interplay 
between fundamental forms of power – such as (1) ‘soft power’ and ‘hard 
power’, (2) ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, as well as (3) ‘power for’ and ‘power 
against’. Forst’s distinction between Herrschaft and Beherrschung, on the other 
hand, is of little – if any – use value for the critical study of power. 
 
 
c. Noumenal power 
The obvious question that poses itself in light of the previous analysis is 
whether or not the concept of noumenal power makes sense. Forst appears to 
suggest that all forms of social power are noumenal forms of power. More 
specifically, he posits that power can be defined as ‘the capacity of A to motivate B 
to think or do something that B would otherwise not have thought or done’142. It is not 
evident, however, why we should use the adjective ‘noumenal’ to describe any 
form of power that corresponds to the above definition. Consider, for 
instance, the following passage: 
[…] I want to claim that the real and general phenomenon of power is to be 
found in the noumenal realm, or better – to avoid misunderstandings about 
Platonic ideas or a Kantian metaphysics of ‘things in themselves’ – in the ‘space of 
reasons’, to borrow Sellars’s famous phrase, understood as the realm of 
justifications.143 
While Forst, explaining the presuppositions that undergird his own 
approach, spells out what ‘noumenal’ does not mean, he fails to make explicit 
what it does mean and why it should be identified with ‘the realm of 
justifications’. In Kantian philosophy, as is widely acknowledged, a noumenon is 
an object that exists independently of the mind (thing-in-itself [Ding an sich]), 
as opposed to a phenomenon, that is, an object that is knowable by the senses 
through phenomenal attributes. Forst asserts that his own use of the term 
‘noumenal’ is not reducible to the way it is employed in Kantian metaphysics or 
in Platonic philosophy. It remains unclear, however, what exactly he means by 
‘noumenal’ and why he chooses to invoke this term to refer to ‘the realm of 
justifications’. 
Another problem emerging in this context concerns the following issue: if 
all forms  of social power are noumenal, then – at least in relation to the 
human world – the term ‘noumenal power’ is a tautology. For, according to this 
definition, there is no such thing as a non-noumenal form of social power. 
What is missing in Forst’s account, therefore, is a rigorous conceptual 
demarcation between ‘the noumenal’ and ‘the non-noumenal’, based on a 
precise explanation of what these two spheres are supposed to represent and 
how they are supposed to differ. Forst’s attempt to identify the former with ‘the 
realm of justifications’ appears to imply that the latter can be conceived of as ‘the 
realm devoid of justifications’, but the reader is left wondering as to whether the 
difference between these two realms actually exists and, if so, whether the 
term ‘noumenal’, let alone the term ‘noumenal power’, should be regarded as 
  
 
appropriate to shed light on their sociological – that is, ontological, genea- 
logical, and functional – specificities. 
 
*** *** *** 
 
Forst’s proposal for a critical theory of noumenal power is based on several key 
assumptions, which have been elucidated above. The validity of the principal 
presuppositions underlying Forst’s conceptual outline shall be examined in the 
following sections. 
 
1. Cognitivism 
Forst’s cognitivist conception of power overestimates the role of cognition and 
consciousness in social life; at the same time, it underestimates the importance 
of the body and the unconscious. In the human world, the effective exercise of 
power is inconceivable without its capacity to shape our corporeal dispositions 
of perception, appreciation, and action. These tend to be acquired, as well as 
mobilized, in habitual and intuitive, rather than reflexive and discursive, ways. 
Both the exercise of and the exposure to power are, primarily, a matter of the 
unfolding of bodily dispositions, rather than of ‘what goes on in the heads’144, of human 
actors.  
Admittedly, Forst seeks to avoid the cognitivist fallacy by conceding that ‘the 
body should not be seen as a reality beyond justification’145 and that, instead, it 
should be interpreted as ‘the result of a certain order in the realm of social 
justifications that makes persons think and feel about themselves in a certain 
way’146. Despite this concession, however, Forst fails to acknowledge the socio-
ontological centrality of the body, let alone the pivotal role played by the 
unconscious in shaping everyday actions and interactions. Ultimately, Forst’s 
attempt to cross-fertilize the (neo-) Foucauldian focus on bodily normalization 
processes and the (neo-) Kantian focus on cognitive categorization processes is 
doomed to failure, because it does not go far enough. Forst’s contention that ‘the 
body is “normalized” [à la Foucault] only through the adoption of certain 
categorizations and “truths” [à la Kant] about its inner self ’147 falls short of 
accounting for the fact that bodily dispositions are largely obtained, and 
drawn upon, without having to rely on noumenal classifications, let alone 
rational justifications. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Rationalism 
Forst’s rationalist conception of power places too strong an emphasis on the role 
of reason in the construction of social life. Indeed, it disregards not only the fact 
that reason is not always the motivational driving force behind human practices, 
but also the fact that subjects capable of speech and reflection often act in 
irrational ways, even if – and, sometimes, especially if – they exercise, or are 
exposed to, a specific degree and type of power. In this respect, it may be 
useful to distinguish between two types of reason: on the one hand, reason as 
a motive or purpose, implying a particular degree of intentionality; on the other 
hand, reason as a root or source, implying a particular degree of causality. The 
former may be conceived of as internal, cognitive, or volitional reason (in German: 
Motiv or Beweggrund); the latter may be described as external, situational, or 
circumstantial reason (in German: Ursache or Grund).  
Forst tends to suggest that the preponderant force in noumenal power 
is the former, rather than the latter. Hence, he overstates the significance of 
reasons based on intentionality and understates the significance of reasons 
founded on causality. Such a rationalist conception of social life leads to a 
reductive conception of power, which fails to take into consideration not only 
the major relevance of non-rational modes of agency to the construction of 
society, but also the structural constraints affecting the course of history. 
Granted, the exercise of power is partly reflected in the capacity ‘to be able – in 
different degrees – to influence, use, determine, occupy, or even seal off the space of reasons 
for others’148. Yet, it is also – and, often, more crucially – illustrated in one’s capacity 
to act without any obvious, let alone self-regulated, reason. Unless ‘the space of 
reasons’ is defined as a realm that includes non-rational, non-intentional, and 
non-discursive reasons, it constitutes too narrow a category to do justice to 
both the complexity and the variety of factors that play a decisive role in both 
the exercise of and the exposure to different forms of power. 
 
3. Recognitivism 
Forst’s recognitivist conception of power is based on the Hegelian conviction 
that there is no exercise of power without the implicit or explicit recognition 
of power relations. Put differently, all power relations are recognitive relations. 
Just as it is vital to explore the manifold ways in which the exercise of power is 
based on processes of recognition, however, it is imperative to examine the 
numerous ways in which it is shaped by, and may reinforce, processes of 
misrecognition. The fact that, in the social world, processes of recognition and 
  
 
processes of misrecognition are inextricably interrelated is highlighted by 
advocates of the ‘politics of identity’149, the ‘politics of difference’150, and the 
‘politics of recognition’151. Grammars of social conflict are constantly being 
defined and redefined not only by struggles for recognition but also by struggles 
against misrecognition. A critical theory of power needs to account for the fact 
that ‘individual and collective actors can be marginalized by the hegemonic 
forces of society because of their identity, because they are different from the 
dominant groups, and because they lack recognition and suffer from 
exclusionary processes of misrecognition’152. Since processes of inclusion often 
involve processes of exclusion in relation to multiple – notably, inferiorized and 
disempowered – actors, struggles for recognition and struggles against 
misrecognition are integral to the production, reproduction, and potential 
transformation of power relations. 
 
4. Justificationism 
Forst’s justificationist conception of power is problematic for a number of reasons. 
(a) Given the centrality accorded to justificatory processes in Forst’s 
architecture of the social, it remains unclear why he characterizes his 
own approach as a ‘critical theory of power’153, rather than as a 
‘justificatory theory of power’, and as a ‘theory of noumenal power’154, rather 
than as a ‘theory of justificatory power’. 
(b) Forst posits that ‘[a]ll […] forms of being moved by justifications are 
“noumenal” in the relevant sense insofar as they involve a certain relation in 
the space of justifications’155. Again, the reader is left wondering why ‘spaces 
of justifications’ should be characterized as ‘noumenal’, rather than 
simply as ‘discursive’. 
(c) Forst presupposes, rather than demonstrates, the validity of the 
assumption that the exercise of power is pervaded by the socio-
ontological preponderance of justificatory processes. Yet, the notion that 
‘[p]ower rests on recognized, accepted justifications’156 applies to some, but 
not to all, variants of power. In numerous instances, subjects exercising a 
particular form of power are not motivated by ‘a “good enough” reason to 
act’157 – irrespective of the question of whether their deeds may be 
regarded as objectively, normatively, and/or subjectively justifiable. We 
need to resist the tendency to fetishize the role of justificatory 
processes by portraying them as omnipresent cornerstones of all 
 constitutive elements of social life. Not all ‘[r]elations and orders of power 
are relations and orders of justification’158, since some of the former are 
not motivated by, and/or bypass the reasoning logic of, the latter. 
(d) One dimension that Forst fails to scrutinize in his account of the 
relationship between justification and power is the nexus between validity 
and legitimacy. The question of whether an action, representing an 
expression of noumenal power, can be considered justifiable or 
unjustifiable depends not only on what is being done, but also on who 
does it when, where, and to whom. ‘For objectivity (“What?”) is – inevitably – a 
matter of social authority (“Who?”), spatiotemporal contextuality (“Where and 
when?”), and interactional relationality (“To whom?”).’159 What is missing in 
Forst’s approach is a critical understanding of the intimate relationship 
between validity and legitimacy160, notably in terms of its far-
reaching consequences for both the construction and the 
deconstruction of power relations. 
(e) Forst’s central claim that ‘[j]ustifications are basic, not interests or desires’161, is 
theoretically naïve and empirically untenable. To the extent that, in 
practice, interests and desires tend to determine reasons and justifications, rather 
than the other way around, the former are effectively more powerful than 
the latter. Human subjects provide all sorts of justifications for their 
actions, especially those that suit them and permit them to attach 
legitimacy to their practices, which take place within objectively, 
normatively, and subjectively contingent realities. Granted, while all 
human actions are interest-laden (that is, permeated by the existence of 
particular interests), not all of them are interest-driven (that is, motivated 
by the pursuit of particular interests). Arguably, the same applies to the 
role of desires in shaping human actions. The point in this context, 
however, is to acknowledge that Forst’s assertion needs to be turned 
upside down in order to be sociologically defensible: interests and desires 
are basic, not justifications (or reasons). In everyday life, most 
justifications are given a posteriori, rather than a priori; that is, 
justifications tend to be provided (either before or after an action takes 
place) in order to attribute legitimacy to a specific action in accordance 
with a person’s interests, desires, and experiences. 
Most of the time, reasons to act in one way or another are derived not 
from reason itself but from the interests that underlie, or indeed 
  
 
constitute, our real reasons. To attribute socio-ontological preponderance 
to justifications is tantamount to constructing an ‘ideal reasoning 
situation’162, in which all justifications – irrespective of whether they are 
deemed ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – acquire the status of an anthropological 
infrastructure, while interests and desires are relegated to the sphere of 
performative epiphenomena. The ‘real interactional situation’163, however, 
designates an empirical conglomerate of circumstances in which interests 
and desires tend to be at  least  as powerful as justifications and reasons 
in shaping human practices. To attach a foundational or determining 
status to one or the other means to fall into the trap  of explanatory 
reductionism. A truly critical theory of power needs to develop a wide-
ranging account of the multiple factors shaping human action. Such a 
daunting task requires providing not only a typology of justifications164 and a 
typology of rationality165, but also a typology of interests166 and a typology of 
desires167, without which there is no satisfying typology of power168. 
(f) Forst stresses the significance of ‘narratives of justification’169 in the exercise 
of power. According to his theoretical framework, ‘[r]elations and orders 
of power are relations and orders of justification’170, which are 
reflected in ‘narratives of justification’171. What Forst fails to take into 
consideration, however, is the fact that, far from being reducible to 
mere epiphenomena of an underlying power infrastructure, narratives 
of justification enjoy ‘relative autonomy’172. Different narratives of justification 
emerge in relation to different historical circumstances characterized 
by different sets of power relations. This does not mean, of course, 
that the former constitute a mere product of the latter. One way of 
capturing the relative autonomy of narratives of justification is to 
explore the role of metanarratives in the modern era.173 From a 
historical perspective, five types of metanarrative have been 
particularly influential: (i) political metanarratives, (ii) philosophical 
metanarratives, (iii) religious metanarratives, (iv) economic 
metanarratives, and (v) cultural metanarratives. A truly critical theory of 
power needs to offer an in-depth understanding of the multiple 
narratives of justification employed by actors to give hermeneutic 
coherence to their practices. Such a challenging task requires providing 
not only a typology of justifications but also a typology of narratives of 
justification, including a typology of metanarratives.174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5. Pluralism 
Forst’s pluralist conception of power is based on the assumption that actors, when 
navigating their way through the matrix of social life, are confronted with ‘a 
spectrum of kinds of acceptance’175 and justification. Different interactional realms 
generate, and are in turn generated by, different ‘spaces of justifications’176. 
What such a pluralist approach does not explain, however, is why some forms 
of power – and, correspondingly, some modes of justification – are more 
influential than others. A critical theory of society needs to confront the chal- 
lenge of exploring not only the polycentric constitution of power, including 
the discursive practices by which it is either reproduced or transformed, but 
also the spatiotemporally contingent conditions that determine why social 
relations are asymmetrically structured and, hence, exert different degrees of 
influence on the micro-spheres (individuals), meso-spheres (communities), 
and macro-spheres (societies) of human existence. 
 
6. Motivationism 
Forst’s motivationist conception of power posits that actors, in order to 
exercise power, have to be driven in one way or another. The social world 
constitutes a universe shaped by a large variety of motivational backgrounds. 
These may be intuitive or discursive, practical or theoretical, instrumental or 
value-rational, pragmatic or ideological, internal or external – to mention just 
a few possibilities. In this respect, the distinction between ‘power to’ and ‘power 
over’ is crucial: subjects may act primarily in accordance with their own (‘power to’) 
or other subjects’ (‘power over’) interests, needs, desires, beliefs, and/or 
convictions. Forst’s approach, however, sheds little – if any – light on the potentially 
convoluted constitution of motivational backgrounds, which can overlap and are 
not always clear-cut in terms of their intentional specificity. When carrying out 
an action, subjects may be driven (consciously or unconsciously) by 
numerous factors, in the broad sense, rather than only by ‘reasons’, in the 
narrow sense. In many cases, it is far from obvious how ‘more decisive’ factors 
can be distinguished from ‘less decisive’ ones, making it remarkably difficult to 
paint a clear and coherent picture of a possibly unclear and incoherent 
motivational background structure. A critical theory of society needs to face up 
to the complexity, diversity, and interpenetrability of the motivations that 
human actors may, or may not, have when engaging in the daily construction 
of power-laden realities. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7. Performativism 
Forst’s  performativist  conception  of  power  stresses  that,  within  human  life  
forms,  all structures and processes are located in spheres of action – that is, in 
realms of practices, performances, and enactments. On this interpretation, the 
exercise of power (Macht) is essentially about being able (pouvoir) to do or to 
make (machen) something in a particular way (Vorgehensweise). In order to grasp 
the sociological relevance of power, it is imperative to comprehend what actors 
do by virtue of power, as well as what they fail to do due to their (relative or 
absolute) lack of access to power. The strength of such a performativist 
approach is that it does justice to the fact that, in the social world, power 
without performance would be powerless. Indeed, ‘[i]f power were not 
performative, our performances would be powerless’177. The weakness of such 
a performativist approach, however, is that, due to its underlying 
anthropocentrism, it focuses exclusively on human forms of agency. Given its 
motivationalist presuppositions, Forst’s approach disregards the influence of 
nonhuman upon human forms of agency, let alone their confluence. In 
technologically advanced ‘global network societies’178, the demarcation line 
between human and nonhuman forms of agency has become (both 
theoretically and practically) more and more blurred, enabling our species to 
push the limits of the traditional separation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’.179 A 
critical sociology of power needs to study both human and nonhuman forms 
of agency if it seeks to offer a comprehensive analysis of the multiple forces 
shaping the development of both individuals and society. 
 
8. Consequentialism 
Forst’s consequentialist conception of power emphasizes that, in order to have any 
relevance to the unfolding of human interactions, power needs to be ‘socially 
effective’180. Yet, Forst’s claim that ‘to have and to exercise power means to be able – in 
different degrees – to influence, use, determine, occupy, or even seal off the space of reasons 
for others’181 is problematic. For it reduces the consequentialist constitution of 
power to an individual or a collective subject’s capacity to shape the space of 
reasons in particular, rather than conceiving of it, more broadly, in terms of the 
ability to affect the space of social arrangements in general. Such a limited 
perspective, founded on a peculiar combination of rationalist deontology 
(‘space of reasons’) and sociological consequentialism (‘social effects’), fails to 
account for the fact that the exercise of power is embedded in multiple 
modes of being-in-the-world: 
 (a) objective, normative, and/or subjective; 
(b) behavioural, ideological, and/or institutional; 
(c) foundational, contingent, and/or ephemeral.182 
(a) As physical beings, we are immersed in objectivity. As social beings, we are 
immersed in normativity. As self-conscious beings, we are immersed in 
subjectivity. 
(b) As performative beings, we engage in and with the world by virtue of 
different forms of behaviour. As meaning-producing beings, we 
engage in and with the world by virtue of different ideologies. As 
organizational beings, we engage in and with the world by virtue of 
different institutions. 
(c) As interdependent beings, we are situated in foundational fields, the 
existence of which is necessary for the emergence of social order. As 
socio-constructive beings, we are situated in contingent fields, the 
existence of which is possible within, but not indispensable to, the 
emergence of social order. As transient beings, we are situated in 
ephemeral fields, the existence of which is largely irrelevant to the 
emergence of social order.183 
Both the exercise of and the exposure to power take place in the 
aforementioned modes of being-in-the-world, all of which affect the 
numerous ways in which we relate to, make sense of, and act upon reality. A 
critical theory of human reality must resist the temptation to reduce its scope 
of analysis to ‘the space of reasons’ and, instead, shed light on the tangible 
consequences of the existence of power relations in ‘the space of society’. 
 
9. Normativism 
Forst’s normativist conception of power accentuates the fact that social relations 
are always open to questioning, competition, and struggle. Noumenal power is 
exercised by, as well as exerted upon, actors who constantly produce, 
reproduce, and transform normative orders. In this respect, we are confronted 
with an irony: on the one hand, Forst underscores the normatively charged 
constitution of power relations, including its discursive representations; on the 
other hand, Forst aims to ‘defend a normatively neutral notion of power’184, failing 
to recognize that there is no such thing as a ‘non-partial’, ‘non-evaluative’, and 
‘non-contestable’ account of power, because every epistemic claim to validity is 
permeated by relationally contingent degrees of social legitimacy. A 
  
 
genuinely normativist understanding of power needs to accept its own 
normativity in order to grasp the relative arbitrariness that characterizes all 
forms of human sociality. 
 
10. Contextualism 
Forst’s contextualist conception of power is a reminder of the fact that all social 
practices are situated in space and time. As such, they are embedded in 
relationally configured sets of circumstances encountered, as well as 
constructed, by human actors. Noumenal power cannot be exercised, let 
alone transformed, ‘in isolation from noumenal-social contexts’185. Irrespective of 
whether ones focuses on objective contexts of physical states of affairs, nor- 
mative contexts of cultural conventions and arrangements, or subjective contexts 
of personal feelings, thoughts, and perceptions – every form of noumenal 
power is located in spheres of objectivity, normativity, and subjectivity.186 It is 
far from obvious, however, what determines which of these three foundational 
spheres of human existence is the most important one in shaping power 
relations in a particular situation. A critical theory of society needs to scrutinize 
the interplay between objective, normative, and subjective factors, shedding 
light on their specific role in producing, reproducing, or transforming power 
relations. Far from being reducible to ‘an objective fact’, ‘a normative 
constellation’, or ‘a subjective projection’, power is always a combination of 
these three elements in spatiotemporally contingent contexts. 
 
11. Coherentism 
Forst’s coherentist conception of power is based on a straightforward 
assumption: noumenal power, in order for it to be effective, requires a 
minimal degree of coherence. Different types of power are embedded in 
different forms of order: social orders, normative orders, orders of 
justification, orders of action, political orders, cultural orders, or moral orders 
– to mention only a few. These orders are symptomatic of the grammatical 
organization of social relations in general and of power relations in 
particular. While these orders are essential for defining the underlying 
parameters of social interaction, variants of disorder may be no less crucial in 
challenging, and redefining, these parameters. Indeed, in some radical cases, 
forms of disorder may become forms of order – that is, forms of disordered order – 
in which, paradoxically, the norm may be the absence of norms. Forst’s 
approach is insightful in illustrating the socio-ontological significance of 
 different orders, but it contains little in the way of contributing to a critical 
understanding of the constitution, let alone the functions, of variants of 
disorder. In the social world, all forms of order can be challenged by manifold 
forms of disorder. In this regard, the interplay between orders and disorders 
of power is no exception. 
 
12. Discursivism 
Forst’s discursivist conception of power maintains that noumenal power is 
exercised through the construction of different narratives – notably, narratives of 
justification. In culturally codified life forms, human beings are expected to 
provide rationally defensible justifications for their actions. Narratives of 
justification constitute discursive frameworks that attribute coherence, 
cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural, ideological, and institutional expres- 
sions of both individual and collective modes of agency. Forst’s approach, 
however, fails to cast light on the complexity of the relationship between power 
structures and narratives of justification. The interplay between, on the one hand, 
conservative and subversive power structures and, on the other hand, 
hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives of justification is irreducible to a 
homological architecture of social determinacy, according to which dominant 
actors necessarily support reactionary discourses oriented towards maintaining 
the status quo and dominated actors necessarily endorse progressive discourses 
oriented towards challenging the status quo.187 A critical theory of society needs 
to face up to the fact that different power arrangements are sustained by 
varieties of discursive constellations, whose relative autonomy escapes the 
stifling logic of structuralist determinism. 
 
13. Foundationalism 
Forst’s foundationalist conception of power insists, above all, on the existence 
of one basic right: the right to justification. The problem with Forst’s approach, 
however, is that it presumes, rather than proves, the validity of the assumption 
that human beings have a right to justification, as if it were built into their 
existence in a quasi-natural fashion. One may draw analogies with natural law 
theories, which face a similar problem, in the sense that they affirm that 
certain rights are inherent in the human condition.188 Depending on one’s take 
on this position, particular – such as civil, legal, political, social, economic, or 
sexual – rights may be interpreted as universal – that is, human – rights. 
Paradoxically, power relations may both confirm and undermine the 
  
 
contention that human beings possess a right to justification: they may 
confirm it, insofar as the exercise of power, in order for it to be viable, needs 
to be justifiable, at least in the eyes of those making use of it; at the same 
time, they may undermine it, insofar as the exercise of power, in extreme 
cases, may not be justifiable, not even in the eyes of those making use of it. 
Indeed, despotic versions of power need not be based on reasonable 
justifications in order for them to be truly powerful. The right to justification is 
worthless to those actors who do not enjoy a right to power, let alone to 
empowerment. 
 
14. Structuralism 
Forst’s structuralist conception of power draws attention to the centrality of four 
aspects of noumenal power: (a) grounding, (b) reproduction, (c) influence, and (d) 
resource. In essence, these four dimensions illustrate that noumenal power is 
inconceivable without the following: 
(a) the normative orders of justification in which it is embedded; 
(b) the normative power of the factual, which manifests itself in the taken-for-
grantedness of the arbitrary; 
(c) the normative impact of interpretive narrativity on the emergence of relatively 
solidified forms of sociality; and 
(d) the normative significance of noumenal capital for the distribution of 
material and symbolic resources, which is reflected in the asymmetrical 
structuration of social positions and dispositions. 
The strength of this approach lies in its capacity to unearth, in a ‘realist’ 
fashion, the relative structural determinacy pervading all forms of human 
sociality. Its weakness, however, stems from its lack of explanatory force 
concerning the unfolding of human agency, notably with regard to its ability 
to challenge its own relative determinacy by virtue of species-constitutive 
features, such as the assertion of autonomy and self-determination guided by 
the empowering cognitive force of different forms of rationality. The cognitive 
resources of reason – epitomized in the species-constitutive triad of Verstand, 
Vernunft, and Urteilskraft189 – are as relevant to exercising power as they are 
crucial to defying it. A critical theory of society needs to account not only for 
the structural determinacy of power relations but also for the extent to which 
they can be called into question – and, if considered necessary, subverted – by 
those who are directly or indirectly affected by them. 
 
 15. Relationalism 
Forst’s relationalist conception of power emanates from one central conviction: 
noumenal power is, by definition, a relational state of affairs. What is missing 
from this interpretation, however, is an analytically precise understanding of 
the five cornerstones of the social in general and of the exercise of power in 
the human world in particular: (a) relationality, (b) reciprocity, (c) reconstructability, 
(d) renormalizability, and (e) recognizability.190 
(a) Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members 
relate to one another. It is made up of relational selves, who cannot exist 
in complete isolation from each other. As such, it constitutes a form of 
being-with-one-another (Miteinandersein). 
(b) Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members 
reciprocate one another. It is sustained by reciprocal selves, who relate to 
each other on the basis of quotidian actions, reactions, and 
interactions. As such, it constitutes a form of being-through-one-another  
(Durcheinandersein). 
(c) Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members 
reconstruct one another. It is created by reconstructable selves, who 
constantly invent and reinvent themselves as well as the realities by 
which they are surrounded. As such, it constitutes a form of being-
beyond-one-another (Jenseitsvoneinandersein or aufhebbares Sein). 
(d) Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members 
renormalize one another. It is shaped by renormalizable selves, who 
attribute meaning and value to each other’s, as well as to their own, 
actions. As such, it constitutes a form of being-about-one-another  
(Übereinandersein). 
(e) Society can come into existence only to the extent that its members 
recognize one another. It is generated by recognizable selves, who seek 
acknowledgment, acceptance, and appreciation when establishing 
meaningful relationships with their fellow human beings. As such, it 
constitutes a form of being-within-one-another (Ineinandersein). 
In short, society can be considered an interactional realm that is brought 
into existence by relational, reciprocal, reconstructable, renormalizable, and 
recognizable selves. It is based on networks of sociality, mutuality, transformability, 
signifiability, and identity, which allow for the emergence of individual and 
collective forms of engagement oriented towards the construction of 
meaning-laden realities. All forms of social power are permeated by these five 
ontological conditions of human coexistence. 
  
 
 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper has been to examine Forst’s account of 
‘noumenal power’. In order to accomplish this, the foregoing investigation has 
covered a number of key aspects arising from the critical analysis of Forst’s 
theoretical framework. 
• The first part has provided some definitional reflections on the concept of 
power, stating that, in the most general sense, it refers to an entity’s capacity 
to do something and/or to act upon the world in a particular way. 
• The second part has focused on several dichotomous meanings attached to 
the concept of power, notably (1) ‘soft power’ vs. ‘hard power’, (2) ‘power to’ 
vs. ‘power over’, and (3) ‘power for’ vs. ‘power against’. 
• The third part has elucidated the principal features of Forst’s 
understanding of ‘noumenal power’, arguing that it can be characterized as 
(1) cognitivist, (2) rationalist, (3) recognitivist, (4) justificationist, (5) pluralist, 
(6) motivationalist, (7) performativist, (8) consequentialist, (9) normativist, 
(10) contextualist, (11) coherentist, (12) discursivist, (13) foundationalist, (14) 
structuralist, and (15) relationalist. Furthermore, attention has been drawn 
to the presuppositional underpinnings of Forst’s typological distinction 
between ‘power’, ‘rule’, ‘domination’, and ‘violence’. 
• The final part has offered an assessment of Forst’s account of ‘noumenal 
power’, maintaining that it suffers from significant limitations. Especially 
noteworthy, in this respect, is its inability to develop an explanatory 
framework capable of capturing the multiple ways in which power 
operates – not only in the noumenal sphere of reason and justification, 
but also, often more forcefully, in the empirical sphere of vested interests, 
unconscious desires, and asymmetrically structured interactions. 
A genuinely comprehensive critical theory of society needs to engage with 
the multifaceted complexity of power191, instead of reducing it to its noumenal 
dimensions, which, irrespective of their socio-ontological centrality, represent 
only part of the story. 
 As should be clear from the previous sections, however, this article – far 
from simply engaging in a discursive demolition exercise – has sought to 
provide a balanced analysis of noteworthy strengths and weaknesses of Forst’s 
conception of noumenal power. Therefore, it seems sensible to conclude by 
giving a synopsis of the vital insights that can be obtained from the preceding 
inquiry: 
(1) In a world shaped by meaning-generating entities, power is 
sustained by virtue of structures and processes of cognition. Our will 
to power is inseparable from our species-constitutive capacity to 
construct reality by interacting with it – and by doing so not only 
intuitively but also reflectively. 
(2) Even in its most inhumane and degrading variants, both the exercise 
of and the exposure to power cannot be dissociated from the 
civilizational force of reason. Subjects who lack access to power lack a 
raison d’être, since the ability to act upon reality in a purposive manner 
lies at the core of a meaningful existence. Our reason to live is 
entrenched in the life of reason. 
(3) To the extent that the successful use of power hinges on processes of 
recognition (and, potentially, on processes of misrecognition), the pursuit 
of social legitimacy is built into the condition of humanity. Struggles 
for recognition, as well as struggles against misrecognition, are so 
deeply implanted in the fabric of everyday life that the unfolding of 
power dynamics is intimately intertwined with practices of social 
positioning. 
(4) The exercise of legitimate power is inconceivable without the (implicit 
or explicit) acceptance of legitimate justifications. Failure to be able to 
provide a valid reason for one’s exercise of power is tantamount to 
the lack of capacity to justify one’s action(s). Regardless of the 
question of whether reasons and justifications are socio-ontologically 
preponderant over interests and desires (or vice versa), the 
development of humanity cannot be divorced from the civilizational 
force of rationality, which manifests itself in the species-empowering 
– notably (a) constative, (b) normative, (c) expressive, (d) 
communicative, and (e) imaginative –  functions of human 
linguisticality. 
 (5) When navigating their way through the matrix of social life, actors 
encounter a spectrum of modes of acceptance and justification. To 
the degree that different interactional realms are produced, 
reproduced, and potentially transformed by different objective, 
normative, and subjective parameters, constellations of power evolve 
in relation to a multiplicity of physical, social, and personal 
components of human existence. 
(6) In order to exercise power, actors have to be driven in one way or 
another, implying that they follow variable and adjustable, yet also 
both habitualized and habitualizing, cognitive patterns of motivation. 
It is because human subjects have a deep-seated need to relate to, 
to make sense of, and to act upon reality that their daily participation 
in the construction of society is pervaded by context-specific modes 
and degrees of intentionality. In a universe shaped by purposeful 
actions and projections, there is no will to live without the will to 
exercise, and the willingness to be exposed to, power. 
(7) If power were not performative, our performances would be not only 
powerless but also pointless. Asserting its empirical significance, the will 
to power (Wille zur Macht) is not necessarily a will to domination (Wille 
zur Herrschaft) but, more fundamentally, a will to action (Wille zur Tat). 
(8) Power matters because both its presence and its absence have 
consequences. To exercise power means to exert some kind of 
influence upon the physical, social, and/or personal dimensions of 
our, and/or other people’s, existence. If it bore no relation to the 
objective, normative, and subjective construction of reality, the 
exercise of power would be irrelevant to the constitution, let alone 
the evolution, of humanity. 
(9) Within the social world, power is exercised by, as well as exerted 
upon, actors who constantly produce, reproduce, and potentially 
transform normative orders. Just as there is no normativity without 
contestability, there is no pursuit of justice – and, indeed, no pursuit 
of injustice – without the value-laden regulation of social realities. 
(10) Power cannot be understood in isolation from the sociohistorically 
specific contexts in which it emerges, for all human practices are 
situated in space and time. The construction of human existence is 
 shaped by the tension-laden confluence of objective factors (such as 
physical states of affairs), normative factors (such as cultural 
conventions and arrangements), and subjective factors (such as 
personal feelings, thoughts, and perceptions). Power – far from 
being reducible to ‘an objective fact’, ‘a normative constellation’, or ‘a 
subjective projection’ – constitutes a combination of these three 
elements in any human life form. 
(11) In order to be effective, power requires a minimal degree of coherence. 
Different types of power are embedded in different forms of order – 
such as social orders, normative orders, orders of justification, orders 
of action, political orders, cultural orders, and moral orders. Any 
attempt to challenge a particular power constellation is futile if it fails to 
confront, let alone to subvert, its grammatical organization. 
(12) The exercise of power is inextricably linked to the construction of 
context-specific discourses, which serve the vital function of providing 
narratives of justification. Both as participants and as observers, 
human subjects draw upon narratives of justification, in order to 
attribute coherence, cogency, and legitimacy to behavioural, 
ideological, and institutional expressions of both individual and 
collective modes of agency. 
(13) Notwithstanding the question of whether human beings possess a 
right to justification, either in a foundationalist sense (as a natural 
right) or in a constructivist sense (as a sociohistorically contingent 
right), power is exercised by, and potentially imposed upon, subjects 
who are not only capable of speech and action but also capable of 
reflection, interpretation, and explanation. Any exercise of power that, 
in the eyes of those who are affected by its influence, fails to obtain at 
least a minimal degree of justifiability is unviable, since legitimacy 
cannot be sustained without a healthy level of acceptability. 
(14) Given its reliance on relatively solidified forms of interaction, the social 
world is composed of multiple sets of power structures. Power 
constellations constitute structural relations that are (a) grounded in 
orders of justification, (b) reproduced by the normative force of the 
factual, (c) sustained by spheres of influence, and (d) shaped by the 
unequal distribution of resources. 
 (15) Power is, by definition, a relational state of affairs. Owing to their 
relational constitution, power constellations are never forever: 
inasmuch as they can be constructed, they can be deconstructed and 
reconstructed. Power is most powerful when those affected by it are 
able to relate to it without noticing it. Power is least powerful when 
those affected by it notice it without being able to relate to it. Either way, 
it permeates – while, at the same time, being permeated by – five 
pillars of human sociality: relationality, reciprocity, reconstructability, 
renormalizability, and recognizability. As long as the social does not 
go away, power will be here to stay. 
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